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FOREWORD
In late 2009, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to address
whether a court’s ruling could amount to a taking of private property.
In other words, could a court, like a legislature, take one’s property
without providing just compensation? “Judicial takings”—a topic that
has long perplexed the academic and legal communities—is the
moniker given to those cases that appear to rest on uncertain
precedent and result in a dramatic change in a property owner’s
rights. To the disappointment of many, however, the U.S. Supreme
Court left the issue of judicial takings largely unresolved. In Stop the
Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental
Protection, the Court unanimously held (8–0) that the Florida
Supreme Court’s ruling did not result in a taking of Florida property
owners’ land because the ruling was consistent with preexisting state
property law. Although the Court may have resolved the narrow issue
in the case before it, many feel that broader questions raised by Stop
the Beach Renourishment remain unanswered. Participants in the
Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy’s sixth annual
symposium attempted to identify and provide insight into these
unresolved issues. This issue—Judicial Takings: Exploring the
Boundaries of the Fifth Amendment—is the product of that
symposium.
The articles in this issue, like the symposium’s panel topics,
explore the idea of judicial takings and the implications for courts
recognizing their existence. As in the Supreme Court’s plurality
opinion in Stop the Beach Renourishment, these articles respond to
the ramifications generated by the Florida Department of
Environmental Protection’s efforts to “renourish” the Florida
coastline. After years of erosion, the Department decided to rebuild
the beaches by dredging sand and creating new dry land. Florida
claimed that it, as opposed to the beachfront residents, now owned
the new dry land that lay adjacent to privately owned properties. An
association of Florida property owners, Stop the Beach
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Renourishment, Inc., sued the Department, alleging that Florida’s
appropriation of the new dry land resulted in a taking of their
property by the legislature. When the Florida Supreme Court held
that the property owners did not, in fact, have a right to this land, the
property owners appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing that
now the state judiciary, in addition to the legislature, had taken what
was rightfully theirs.
That Court, however, did not agree. In June 2010, the Supreme
Court affirmed, holding that the Florida Supreme Court did not take
its residents’ property without just compensation in violation of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Despite an endorsement of the
notion of judicial takings by a plurality of the court, the Court failed
to provide a majority opinion (or any opinion at all) on many aspects
relevant to the case: Does the Takings Clause in fact apply to all three
branches of the government? What standard of review should federal
courts use to evaluate a claim that a state court has misapplied a
question of its own property law? Each article in this edition attempts
to explore more deeply the doctrine of judicial takings and to ask why
the Supreme Court may have reached the proper result, but for the
wrong reasons.
This symposium would not have been possible without the
generous support of the Duke Law Program in Public Law. We thank
the Program in Public Law in addition to DJCLPP’s advisors,
Professors Ernest A. Young and Joseph Blocher, whose guidance
made this event a success. We also thank all of the participants in the
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